The Evolution of Societal Order and the Imperatives of Justice
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Man is compelled to maintain society, from necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same creature, in his farther progress, is engaged to establish political society, in order to administer justice; without which there can be no peace among them, nor safety. We are, therefore, to look upon all the vast apparatus of our government, as having ultimately no other object or purpose but the distribution of justice…
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All men are sensible of the necessity of justice to maintain peace and order; and all men are sensible of the necessity of peace and order for the maintenance of society. Yet, notwithstanding this strong and obvious necessity, such is the frailty or perverseness of our nature that it is impossible to keep men unerringly, in the paths of justice. Some extraordinary circumstances may happen, in which a man finds his interests to be more promoted by fraud or rapine. But much more frequently, he is seduced from his important but distant interests, by the allurement of present, though often frivolous temptations. This great weakness is incurable in human nature.
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Men must, therefore, endeavour to palliate what they cannot cure. They must institute some persons, under the appellation of magistrates, whose peculiar office it is to point out the decrees of equity, to punish transgressors, to correct fraud and violence, and to oblige men to consult their own real and permanent interests. In a word, obedience is a new duty which must be invented to support that of justice; and the ties of equity must be corroborated by those of allegiance.
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But still, viewing matters in an abstract light, it may be thought, that nothing is gained by this alliance, and that the factitious duty of obedience, from its very nature, lays as feeble a hold of the human mind, as the primitive and natural duty of justice. Peculiar interests and present temptations may overcome the one as well as the other. They are equally exposed to the same inconvenience. And the man, who is inclined to be a bad neighbour, must be led by the same motives, to be a bad citizen and subject. The magistrate himself may often be partial, or unjust in his administration.
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Experience, however, proves, that there is a great difference between the cases. Order in society, we find, is much better maintained by means of government; and our duty to the magistrate is more strictly guarded by the principles of human nature, than our duty to our fellow-citizens. The love of dominion is so strong, that many not only submit to but court all the dangers, and fatigues, and cares of government; and men, once raised to that station, though often led astray by private passions, find, a visible interest in the impartial administration of justice. The persons, who attain this distinction by the consent, of the people, must be endowed with superior personal qualities of valour, force, integrity, or prudence, which command respect and confidence: and after government is established, a regard to birth, rank, and station has a mighty influence over men, and enforces the decrees of the magistrate.. . . Men, once accustomed to obedience, never depart from that path, in which they and their ancestors have constantly trod, and to which they are confined by so many urgent and visible motives.
