The planned expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into Eastern Europe has been compared by one sour critic to the behavior of a couple in a crumbling marriage, who instead of going to a marriage counselor decide to try to save their relationship by having a baby, or possibly even several babies. NATO itself is in the middle of a very confused debate about its identity and role, and partly as a result it is difficult to detect any honest, coherent discussion in the West of the necessity for expansion and of how it will affect relations with Russia, the security of the Ukraine and the Baltic States, and the peaceful integration of Ukraine into Europe.
The official Western line at present is that NATO expansion is meant to "strengthen European security, " but not against Russia or against feared Russian aggression. Nevertheless all public discussion in Poland, and much of it in the United States has been conducted in terms of the need to contain a presumed Russian threat and to prevent Russia from exerting influence on its neighbors—influence that is automatically viewed as illegitimate and threatening to the West.
The overwhelming majority of Russian politicians, including most liberals, now believe it is necessary that most of the former Soviet Union excluding the Baltic States be within a Russian sphere of influence. They see this not as imperialism but as a justifiable defense of Russian interests against a multiplicity of potential threats (radical Islam, future Turkish expansionism), of Russian populations outside Russia, and of areas in which Russia has long maintained a cultural presence—Ukraine, for example.
This does not necessarily involve demands for hegemony over Russia's neighbors, but it certainly implies the exclusion of any other bloc's or superpower's military presence. In justification Russians point to the Monroe Doctrine and to the French sphere of influence in Africa. Most educated Russians now view Western criticism as mere hypocrisy masking Western aggrandizement.
The attitude of the entire Russian political establishment to the expansion issue is now strongly and unanimously negative, though the government hopes for the moment to continue exerting influence against expansion by cooperating with NATO—hence its agreement to join the Partnership for Peace. The reasons for Russian opposition are these: NATO expansion is seen as a betrayal of clear though implicit promises made by the West in 1990—91, and a sign that the West regards Russia not as an ally but as a defeated enemy. Russians point out that Moscow agreed to withdraw troops from the former East Germany following unification after NATO promised not to station its troops there.
Now NATO is planning to leapfrog over eastern Germany and end up 500 miles closer to Russia, in Poland. Western arguments that the 1990 promise to Mikhail Gorbachev referred only to East Germany, not to the rest of Eastern Europe, though strictly speaking correct, are not unnaturally viewed by Russians as purely jesuitical.
Russian officials say that the NATO expansion would lead to a reversal of the previous pro—Western policy of the Yeltsin and Gorbachev governments. Also, Russians fear that NATO expansion will ultimately mean the inclusion of the Baltic States and Ukraine within NATO's sphere of influence, if not in NATO itself—and thus the loss of any Russian influence over these states and the stationing of NATO troops within striking distance of the Russian heartland. The West's inability publicly to rule out the possible future incorporation of any country in NATO makes it very difficult to assuage Russian fears.
In the context of the analogy in the first paragraph, the couple is to the baby as:[A] NATO is to Russia.
[B] Russia and NATO together are to an Eastern European country.
[C] NATO is to an Eastern European country.
[D] Eastern Europe is to NATO.
If the author of this passage were asked in an interview about his feeling regarding potential action that NATO might take with regard to the passage, he would probably give his greatest support to which of the following actions by NATO?[A] Admitting officially that NATO expansion is meant to contain the Russian threat
[B] Halting expansion once Poland has been absorbed into NATO
[C] Stating publicly that Ukraine will never be included in NATO's sphere of influence
[D] Reconsidering plans to establish a presence in Eastern Europe
Judging from the passage, the "clear though implicit promises " made by the West to Russia in 1990—91 were promises that:[A] the West would allow Russia to station troops in Poland.
[B] the West would not station troops in any East European country.
[C] the West would withdraw its troops from East Germany following unification.
[D] the West would leapfrog over East Germany into Poland.
Based on the passage, which of the following could be considered true beliefs of the majority of Western diplomats?[A] II only
[B] II and III
[C] I and III
[D] I, II and III
Based on the passage, which of the following could one most reasonably expect of a country that is attempting to expand its sphere of influence?[A] A complete cessation of communication with potential enemies
[B] A declaration that the purpose of expansion is greater security
[C] A stubborn refusal to admit defeat when it has in fact been suffered
[D] A prolonged period of careful planning and diplomatic negotiation
Which of the following theories seems most in agreement with the Russian justification for maintaining a Russian sphere of influence?[A] It's all right to do something if someone else has done it.
[B] If you want something done right, you have to do it yourself.
[C] If you can't beat them, you should join them.
[D] You can never accumulate too much power and influence.